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I would additionally like to thank Virginia Anderson for her kindness and support. She helps me a lot with thesis and graduation paperwork, and she is always very warm and friendly. viii ABSTRACT Advanced Persistent Threats(APT) are a serious concern to secure an organization. The sophistication of APT attacks is much discussed, and the recent compromising of Google, RSA and Sony using APTs has gained lots of attentions. Successful protection against APTs should complement traditional perimeter and infrastructure security measures and policies. In this paper, we show that adding APTs in our threat landscape, conventional attack graphs for realistic environments are quite dense meaning that their utility is quite limited. This density is a consequence of common, inherent vulnerabilities in conventional computing systems and network environments. Our approach is to formally define a set of vulnerabilities that we call privilege expansion vulnerabilities. A superset of privilege escalation vulnerabilities, privilege expansion refers to cases where an attacker can either earn greater privilege on the current host or use his current privilege to earn privileges on other hosts. Based on our formal definitions, we define a set of rules for adding edges to attack graphs and develop a tool that computes a closure of these rules in the graph. For two example environments, we compute new attack graphs incorporating these new edges and demonstrate the use of the tool by evaluating addressing 4 different privilege expansion vulnerabilities.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Attack graphs (AGs) have been proposed for a multitude of practical network and organizational security uses. In our study of the attack graph literature, we have discovered that many so-called privilege expansion vulnerabilities (PEVs) have been left out of the analyses. Unfortunately, this oversight causes some of the analyses in the past work to be dramatically optimistic in terms of the security of the network or organization. Two competing conclusions can be drawn from this work:
• Current attack graph methodologies must be extended to deal with the added complexity of PEVs.
• If one accepts the existing attack graph methodologies, then we must make greater effort to make attacks on PEVs more difficult..
In this work, we develop a structured representation of common vulnerabilities and develop a tool that applies these to an organization's conventional attack graph. We find that the density of the graph grows dramatically in density and exploitability. Furthermore, we demonstrate the effect of addressing privilege expansion vulnerabilities by doing "what if" experiments using our tool.
Attack graphs have had several incarnations in the literature, but in general they can be described as a graph of access states reachable by an attacker. The states are connected by directed edges that indicate an attack is possible from the current state to another one. To our knowledge, all published AG work to date has been based on rather simplistic types of attacks such as remote root/user attacks, .rhosts, local user to root attacks, and the like while constrained by issues such as reachability between hosts enforced by tools such as firewalls. The result is that it is possible to generate attack graphs by processing the output of network vulnerability scanners and related tools.
In our opinion, this focus on attacks in the AG literature has lead it to neglect of widespread, practical vulnerabilities that are common knowledge of attackers and penetration testers. 1 For example, with 1 Although users of attack graphs may be taking these vulnerabilities into account, it is not apparent to the authors that the past work has given such guidance. Furthermore, as we show in this paper, taking PEVs into account dramatically increases access to the appropriate privilege, it is relatively easy to monitor networks for passwords, install keylogging software or other malware thereby capturing passwords for users of the network. This equates to several classes of vulnerabilities inherent to common operating systems and their typical configurations. In this case and others that we describe more formally in Section 3, these PEVs create a many new edges and reachable states in the attack graph thereby increasing the density of the attack graph for an organization. Furthermore, as we consider different classes of PEVs, we show that closures of the graph over different classes of PEVs exacerbate the density issue.
As in past AG work (described in Section 2), our approach begins with two simple example network scenarios. We extract the attack graph for the network based on a manual analysis. For 5 PEVs, we have developed a set of formal rules for extending the original attack graph. We then apply these rules in turn such that no further edges can be added to the resulting AG thereby greatly increasing its density. Based on this analysis, in Section 4 we consider how this density affects proposed applications of AGs and what it implies for network security . In Section 5, we describe a tool we have developed to evaluate the effects of PEVs on an organizational attack graph. As future work, we conclude with a discussion of approaches to evaluating the prevalence of these issues in large-scale network AGs and with approaches to dealing with the increased complexity that PEVs add to attack graphs. the size of AGs and hence affects scaleability.
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUD AND PAST WORK ON ATTCK GRAPH

The Attack Graph Formalism and Terminology
Many variations on the attack graph formalism exist in the past work, but in general they essentially all share the following characteristics.
• S is a set of states of the form, (h, p), wher h is an host object, and p is some privilege on that host.
• E is a set of directed edges, (s i , s j ) : s i , s j ∈ S such that there exists a vulnerability in the network such that a subject attains s j .p privileges on host s j .h. given the privileges s i .p on host
• L is a function mapping e ∈ E onto a subset of the possible vulnerabilities, V e ⊂ V .
Note that this formalism, AG, can be viewed as a requires/provides graph [17] , a finite state machine (by adding an initial state as well as one or more goal states) as in [6] , and a markov system by adding probabilities to each edge and an initial vector [15] . These and other works on the topic attempt to encode a dependency graph that allows for some sort of automated or manual analysis.
It should also be noted that the term "attack graph" is something of a misnomer. Each edge typically represts a possible attack on the target of the edge from its source node. In other words, the edges are vulnerabilities and not strictly attacks. This would be a simple case of mistaken terminology, but we argue that it has lead to an underestimation of the density of attack graphs and a subsequent overestimation of their utility in typical environments. We discuss this in greater detail in the following sections.
Usage of Attack Graphs
Attack Graphs have been proposed for manys uses including risk assessment, network hardening and intrusion detection. [7] have proposed quantitative and qualitative approachs for security evaluation based on attack graphs. In our paper, we apply the metrics defined in [1] and [15] in section 3.
Risk Assessment
Network hardening Security analysts can also use attack graphs to determine the most efficent or the minimum cost set of actions to prevent attacks against some given critical resources [13] [5] [18] .
These actions may include changing configuration or introducing new countermeasures, patching sufficient network vulnerabilites at the entry points, or adding intrusion detection systems to monitor network activities.
Intrusion Detection Attack graph can enhance the alert correlation approaches in a number of ways, for instance, matching intrusion events, hypothesizing missing events, recognizing attack patterns, predicting attack plan and protecting IDS form alert flooding attacks. In [11] [14] , the authors propose correlating alerts using attack graphs. The idea is to group alarms corresponding to edges nearby in the graph to eliminate false positives and detect higher-level attacks.
Each of these uses depend on the attack graph to be an accurate representation of the network environment's vulnerability. Our work shows how the attack graph changes radically when PEVs are considered. Most of this past work has ignored the majority of the PEVs we discuss leading to strongly optimistic results in that the number of states reachable by an attacker is underrepresented in the presented attack graphs. In fairness, we also note that attack graphs are by necessity always somewhat optimistic as it is unlikely that an analyst has a comprehensive database of all vulnerabilities in a large
CHAPTER 3. PRIVILEGE EXPANSION VULNERABILITIES
In this section, we describe a set of well-known vulnerabilities and formalize rules for each that modify an existing attack graph. Another way to think about these rules is that they specify a set of default edges in an attack graph for an organization given its hosts, users, network topology, and certain information about security mechanisms employed by the systems.
For our purposes here, a privilege expansion vulnerability is a property of one or more hosts in the network such that an attacker can gain some new privilege through some feasible action. Note that such an action is not necessarily an attack. In terms of an attack graph, a PEV is a reachable state in the attack graph coupled with properties of one or more related hosts that then allows us to add new edges to the graph. This returns to our earlier assertion that if we only consider AGs composed of conspicuous attack behavior then we underestimate the security situation significantly.
Authentication Relations
Several of our PEVs are related to authentication weaknesses in remote login mechanisms. In particular, we focus on the the observability and reusability of authentication information. The developed relation will be useful in defining several of our rules below.
Hosts use a variety of authentication systems to establish subject identity. These range from untrustworthy claims of source address to passwords to challenge/response systems based on public key cryptography. For our purposes, we classify an authentication mechanism based on whether the observability of authenticator data on the network and whether the data is reuseable by an attacker if it is monitored either in the network or otherwise.
Definition 2. Let Reuseable be a function Reuseable : u × h → {T rue, F alse}, where u is a user identifier on the host, h. Reuseable will be true if and only if the user u can authenticate to a service on h such that the authentication information provided by u can be replayed to authenticate for another session if acquired by another subject.
Definition 3. Let Observable be a function Observable : u × h → {T rue, F alse}, where u is a user identifier on the host h. Observable is true when u is able to authenticate to some service of h over the network using a method such that an evesdropper can observe the value of the authenticator.
For our purposes, these two functions conveniently describe authentication mechanisms while ignoring mostly irrelevant detail. If a host, h 1 uses passwords and clear text login protocols such as telnet for a user u 1 , then Observable(h 1 , u 1 ) ∧ Reuseable(h 1 , u 1 ). An SSH service configured to accept only encrypted connections but authenticating with passwords would result in ¬Observable(h 1 , u 1 ) ∧ Reuseable(h 1 , u 1 )-thereby encoding that although one can not intercept the password in transit, it is still possible for someone to use the password to authenticate in the future if it is captured on either the client or server hosts. A one-time password scheme would be observable yet not reuseable.
Note that we do not specify the service for which the user is requesting authentication in the above functions. This is slightly sloppy as it neglects the case where multiple login services are available on a host with inconsistent observability or reuseability values. For the purposes of this paper, we will assume all login services of interest on a given host for a user have the same observability and reusability. This simplifies the forthcoming rules but does so in a way that the attack graph remains optimistic in the sense that it still underestimates possible actions of attacker.
Another issue with these functions is that it is possible to have multiple authentication methods for a single service. Systems such as pluggable authentication modules (PAM) and SSH can create this situation. Because attack graphs encode the actions possible for an attacker, the solution here is to consider that if any of the mechanisms use reuseable authenticators, we should assert that it the case is reuseable, otherwise the authenticator should be considered nonreuseable. If any of the mechanisms rely on observable authenticators, then we only consider the the host to have observable authenticators if that same mechanism is also reuseable. In other words, the observable case is only useful if that same mechanism is reuseable. Example: One-time passwords (transmitted in the clear) configured in a login service that also supports encrypted tunnels using conventional passwords. The former case is observable but not reuseable whereas the latter is only reuseable. An attacker can not easily gain from the observability of the one-time passwords hence we consider this case ¬Observable ∧ Reuseable.
Definition of Five Common PE Rules
The easiest, and in our experience with IT infrastructure the most common, PEV is that users share the same authentication information across different hosts. A well-known problem, the user access PE rule allows an initial break-in to provide access to a real user's account across a wide variety of hosts.
The reachability function Reachable(h , h) determines that the host h can be reached from host h' in the network. This is similar to the reachability described in [4] [12].
The User Access PE Rule is prevalent because users for convenience or manageability reasons use the same passwords or other reuseable authentication methods. This rule affects the attack graph by adding new edges pointing to the states representing the compromised user account on all other hosts which are reachable and can be accessed using the same password.
Another ubiquitous issue that has been ignored in the AG community is malware. If an attacker can cause another user to execute software unknowingly, it is likely that the attacker can gain a password from the user. There are many ways that this may happen in practice, but for our purposes, we consider that an attacker has access to a host and that this access allows the attacker to insert some malware so that the user will automatically execute it. Examples of this are keyloggers (for the targetted user anyway), Trojan Horse login mechanisms, etc. The difficulty of this varies from system to system and also depends on the security awareness of the targeted user.
PE Rule 2. Trojan Horse PE
Given (h, u) ∈ S, if Reuseable(u , h) ∧ CanGetT oExecute(u, u ),
Note: The function CanGetT oExecute(u, u ) means that u can cause user u to execute some arbitrary code. There are several implications of the Trojan Horse Rule. If the attacker has administrative privileges on the system, the trojan horses can do any thing the administrator can do. Trojan horse PE rule specifies the effect of trojan horse attack on the attack graph. If attackers install a trojan horse program on the compromised host, and successfully cause other users to execute that program, the new edges will be added pointing from the state representing the user account on the compromised host to the state representing the users who executed the trojan on the same host.
Note: The function LocalAdminExploit(u, h) means that host h has a local exploit which allows the user u to gain administrative privileges on this host.
Once the attackers remotely login to the compromised host, they will attempt to exploit some local vulnerabilities to increase their privilege to the administrative level. If the attackers successfully exploit some user-to admin vulnerability on this affected host, they will take the full control over this system.
The edge from the state representing the user account on the compromised host to the state representing administrator on the same host will be added to the attack graph.
PE Rule 4. Admin-to-Users PE
Given (h, admin) ∈ S, if µ = {u |Reuseable(u , h)},
When the attacker has complete control on the compromised host, they will have an excellent chance to steal all the usernames and passwords on this host. They could access the encrypted password file or obtain the password hashes, and start cracking passwords. Or the attackers just replace the login program. The replacement program will record and send the usernames and passwords to the attackers when users log into the system. According to the Admin-to-User PE rule, if administrative privilege is obtained on the compromised host, the edges pointing from the state representing the administrator on this host to the states representing each users on the same host will be added to the attack graph.
PE Rule 5. Network Sniffer PE
Given (h, admin) ∈ S, let µ = {(u , h )|Reuseable(u , h )∧Observable(u , h )∧SameLan(h , h)},
When the attackers log into the compromised host as an administrator, they can start up a network sniffer on each interface, monitoring the network traffic crossing the local area network. All the usernames and passwords transmitted in clear text will be discovered, and passwords are useful unless they are reusable. Network Sniffer PE rule exposes the effect of this kind PE vulnerability to the attack graph by adding the new edges between the state representing the administrator account on the compromised host and states representing the hosts with user accounts which passwords are reusable and transmitted in the clear-text on the network.
Note: The function P ath(h , h ) determines the transmission path between the host h and h
Attackers not only can sniff the local network user passwords, but also can see all the traffic across the LAN and thus can capture sensitive information which transmitted in clear text.
These privilege expansion vulnerabilities are neither new nor exhaustive for host configuration. As our knowledge, most of attack graphs do analysis ignoring these vulnerabilities, and we need a strong mechanism and analysis to integrity these issue.
These types of vulnerabilities are different from others, because they are some probability of successful attack, for instance, rule 1, 3, 4, and 5. and often require some actions by other users. It may take times, or may leave subsets of edges being useful for an attacker. Traditional attack graph edges are probability more likely to be more exploitable, but there are still level of difficulty and uncertainty, because the local environment may preclude successful exploitation.
Future work could attempt to evaluate the exploitability of the vulnerabilities in the real environments. Another lesson from this work is to motivate the use of protective measures such as cryptographic authentication, hardening host operating systems, and encrypted network protocols.
CHAPTER 4. Privilege Expansion Density Effect
In this section, we demonstrate the effect of privilege expansion vulnerabilities on the attack graph through a network example. In the example, we take the attack graph generated by the previous approaches [4] [19] as input, and then iteratively apply the PE rules to it, until no more rules are applicable. We compare the final output graph with the initial one in respect to graph structure, density, exploitability [1] and mean effort to security failure [15] . 
Attack Graphs
Based on network tologolgy, vulnerabilities and connectivity information, we obtain the attack graph shown in Figure 4 .1.1 as our initial. Starting with the initial attack graph, we iteratively apply the PE rules on the graph, one rule at a time, and terminates when no further successful expansion are found. Figure 4 .1.0 shows the corresponding attack graph at each step after applying PE Rule 1 
Comparison of Attack Graph structure and Density
An attack graph is a directed graph where each vertex is a possible attack state and each edge represents possible vulnerabilities which allow the attack to proceed from one state to another. Graph density is a fraction of graphs edges to the maximum number of graph edges. The density reflects how interconnected attack states are and how close the attack graph is to a complete graph. The graph density is expected to increase as PE rules are applied. states, the number of edges and graph density at each step 1 .
The result shows that the size of attack graph grows dramatically. The initial attack graph is very sparsely connected with only 4 possible attack states and graph density of 0.023; While the closure has 90 possible attack states, and the density is larger than 0.5, which is increase by 2239 percent.
The security threats in this example network are significantly more widespread than initially estimated Table 4 .1.1: Graph structure and density without taking into account the privilege expansion vulnerabilities.
Comparison of Attack Graph
After applying PE rules, the size and density of attack graph grows dramatically, and the complexity of closure attack graph greatly exceeds human ability to understand and analyze. In [10] , Mehta et al.
proposes to use Google PageRank algorithm to calculate the relative importance of each state in the attack graph. The ranking indicates how likely the state is to be compromised by attackers.
Google PageRank PageRank is an algorithm used by Google search engine to determine the relative importance of webpages. Pagerank models the user web broswering behaviors as markov process in which the states are pages, and the transitions, which are all equally probable, are the links between pages. It also introduce damping factor d to capture the behavior that a random surfer get bored and restart.
Similar to Google PageRank algorithm, we construct a Probabilistic Attack Model for our attack graph, in which a transition from a state to another state represents an atomic attack. In [10] , authors prove Probabilistic Attack Model is ergodic Markov chain, and it will converges to a unique stationary distribution after a long run. Damping factor models either the attacker will abort the current attack and try a different way to attack the system or that the attacker could directly reach some states by other means which is not modeled by attack path. For example, the attacker could trick the victim to visit some malicious website, which serves browser zero-day vulnerabilities. After exploiting the vulnerabilities, the victim's computer got hacked. The results shows again that there are much more states reachable in the closure attack graph. The most likely state (userA, H9) and (userE, H7) in the initial attack graph don't score that high in the closure attack graph, and these states become very transient after applying PE Rule.
Comparison of Exploitability
The paper [1] by Balzarotti et al. proposes a metric to quantitatively evaluate the risk of network system based on the knowledge of the exploitability of vulnerabilities and interactions and dependency among them. The exploitability of a vulnerability measures how complex the attack can be to exploit it and the likelihood of successful exploits. In our example, we use this metric to compute the exploitability for each attack state in the graph. We assign the exploitability values to each vulnerability ranging from 0 to 10. Table 4 .2.1 summarizes the values for each vulnerability. The exploitability of V1, V3, PE1, PE3 and PE5 are high, because they are well-known widespread and very easy to be exploited with little effort; while V4, V5 and PE2 are hard to be exploited, and few have been successfully exploited by previous attacks, therefore, the values are low; The exploitability of PE4 is on a medium scale.
The initial exploitability values for each attack state are all set to 0. Starting with the attacker state, we iteratively update the values for each attack state by computing the easiest way (i.e., the maximum value) of exploiting this state in the graph, until the system converges to stable. We implemented a toolkit to facilitate integrating privilege expansion vulnerabilities into attack graph for varied network environments. 
A Medium-sized Network Example
We use the PE toolkit to produce an attack graph for a medium-sized network shown in Figure Our initial attack graph contains 5 reachable attack states and 11 edges, and the density is 0.075%;
while the closure attack graph produced by the PE toolkit has 122 attack states, 3672 edges, and the density is nearly one quarter(24.87%), which is 331.6 times denser than the initial. Some part of the closure graph is too dense to be rendered appropriately in Dot, therefore, instead we use kamada-kawai algorithm in R [16] to layout the graph shown in Figure 5 .2.2. The attack graph can be partitioned into six equivalence classes, and each class is a complete graph. Class A only has 1 node: node 122, which represents the attacker on the external network; Class B have two nodes: node 49 and 3, which represents the servers on DMZ; Class C and Class F are the similar in the structure, and each has 45 nodes respectively, which represents all the attack states in which users only have privileges on only one LAN; Class E are class D are similar in the structure, and each has 15 nodes respectively, which represents all the attack states in which users have privileges on both LANs. From the graph, it is easy to draw two conclusions. First, the protection boundary is between Class A and Class B, and it is dangerous to let the attacker cross the boundary and enter into DMZ. Second, node 76, 39 and 95
are entry points to the internal network, Once any entry point gets to be compromised, the attacker can jump to almost any attacker states in this attack graph.
Integrating the privilege expansion vulnerabilities and make attack graph more complete is one purpose of the PE toolkit, and another is to allow security administrator to analyze and compare the impact of different security solutions and policies on the whole network systems. Suppose the security administrator proposes the following possible security solutions to mitigate the risk of systems:
• Solutions A: Change to encrypted network protocol in the internal networks
• Solutions B: Enforce a stronger user account management policy, which means any user can not use the same password for multiple hosts.
• Solutions C: Harden the operating systems and make Trojan horse attack become much harder to success Table 5 .2.1 shows that in these three solutions, the solution B is the most effective one, since without user access expansion, attacker can not jump to other hosts and then take the chances to expand his privileges.
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION
In this work, we define a set of privilege expansion vulnerabilities, and integrate them into attack graphs by formalizing a set of rules used for adding or modifying existing attack graphs. Based on two example attack graphs, we have shown how neglecting PEVs can lead to drastically optimistic attack graphs. This can be seen in the dramatic increase in graph density as well as increase in the exploitation metric of hosts in the network. This indicates that we can not neglect these vulnerabilities, otherwise our attack graphs, and any analysis based on them will not be complete. In addition, we developed a tool to integrate the privilege expansion vulnerability into existing attack graphs. The tool can also can be used for simulating and evaluating the new security solutions by comparing countermeasures that reduce the effect of PEVs. Our future work will evaluate the relative exploitability of privilege expansion vulnerabilities in the real environment and study how to use and better represent these dense attack graphs.
